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ABSTRACT 
This article is a response to Ule’s ideas on the (im)possibility of naturalizing the mind. After 
providing a brief overview of some of the main inconsistencies in Ule’s account, I argue that a 
naturalistic explanation of the key feature of the mind as construed by Ule (“experiential 
perspectivity”) is, in fact, feasible, but only if it is complemented by an equally important shift in our 
conception of nature. The central part of the article consists of two steps. First, following the line of 
thought developed (predominantly) by Jonas and Varela, the article attempts to outline a route to the 
naturalization of “perspectivity” along the lines of the so-called autopoietic theory and the 
corresponding double dialectic of identity and sense making. Secondly, I emphasize that this is merely 
the first half of the story, and that the second element in Ule’s construal of the mind, “experientiality”, 
cannot be explained within the metaphysical framework of modern naturalism, but calls for a radical 
restructuring of our field of inquiry in terms of the fundamental circularity between lived experience and 
scientific endeavour. Thus, the process of the naturalization of life and mind needs to be reciprocated 
by the process of the phenomenologization of nature and reconceptualization of naturalism. 
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THE SPECTRE OF NATURALIZATION 
For the past century, the question of the naturalization of the mind has been in the forefront of 
scientific and philosophical debate. The question is an extremely difficult one, plagued with a 
range of thorny metaphysical and epistemological issues, not least because “naturalization” 
and “naturalism” are frequently conflated with “reduction” and “reductive physicalism”. The 
main aim of the article is not to unravel these philosophical knots in toto – a daunting, if not 
impossible task – but to try and shed light on one of the multitude threads that constitute this 
complex theoretical fabric. Specifically, it intends to first underline and then undermine some 
of the conclusions about the (im)possibility of naturalizing the mind as propounded by A. Ule 
in his article “Some Reflections on the Possibility of Naturalizing the Mind” [1]. In so doing, 
it hopes to show that certain vistas that have been overlooked by Ule might provide answers 
to at least some of the objections raised in his critique and house interesting possibilities for 
the naturalization of life and mind. These possibilities have far-reaching implications, and I 
will try to delineate some of the more pertinent ones, but without providing an exhaustive 
treatment of the subject. In this regard, the article is intended more as food for (additional) 
thought, and not as a comprehensive solution to the problem. 
With this introductory proviso in place, let us now turn to the matter at hand. In his article, 
Ule argues against the possibility of naturalizing the mind (or spirit)1. After a brief 
examination of three different attempts at naturalization – Bateson’s system theory of mind, 
Pierce’s theory of semiotics, and theories based on the concept of biosemiosis – he goes on to 
claim that they all fall short on at least two counts: first, they are unable to explain how 
minds, construed primarily as “semiotic” or “information systems”, might have emerged 
from the “inanimate” and “causally-determined nature” [1; p.506] (“genealogical” aspect); 
secondly, and more importantly, they are unable to account for the “experiential perspective” 
in living beings (“metaphysical” aspect): 
“To have an experiential perspective is, in my opinion, a necessary condition 
for the emergence of higher forms of semiosis, forms that include complex 
perceptions of different life situations and anticipations of possible future 
occurrences, e.g. an ability to anticipate how other organisms would react to 
one’s behaviour in a given situation. It should be emphasized that having a 
personal experiential perspective doesn’t necessarily entail being conscious of 
oneself, having an idea of the self, etc.” [1; p.507]. 
Unfortunately, Ule’s construal of the notion of “experiential perspectivity” is rather opaque. 
On the one hand, it seems to designate “a discriminative capacity” that enables living beings 
“to perceive and evaluate situations that are relevant for them from the point of view of the 
informational system as a whole” [1; pp.502-503], i.e. “an ability of an organism […] to form 
a center of sense impressions that might serve as a starting point or a central referential point 
in the evaluation of not only potential, but also actual events in the environment of that 
organism” [1; p.507]. On the other hand, experiential perspective is said to “necessitate the 
existence of the so-called qualia, i.e. the irreducible qualities of those feelings that, 
according to the representational view, are located ‘inside’ of an organism (or on its bodily 
surface)” [1; p.507]. Thus, the overall picture seems to oscillate between a “functionalist” 
(third-person) and a “qualitative” (first-person) account, leaving the reader wondering why, 
and how, the two are related. In fact, the author himself seems to be raising precisely this 
issue when, referring to the qualitative aspect, he points out that “[t]hese feelings [i.e. qualia] 
cannot be fully reduced to representations of the objective state of affairs that lacks any kind of 
experiential perspective” [1; p.508]. Although important, I will not pursue these inconsistencies 
here, but will simply assume that the concept of “experiential perspectivity” encompasses 




both aspects: (a) the ability to (i) establish and maintain a “center” or “central referential 
point” capable of (ii) realizing meaningful relations with its environment (perspectivity); and 
(b) the qualitative or phenomenal character associated with (a) (experientiality). 
Unsatisfied with the three approaches, Ule goes on to sketch an alternative account of the 
mind’s place in nature, suggesting that “in addition to time-space dimensions, the material 
reality itself (i.e. the material cosmos) must also possess the perspectivity dimension, i.e. the 
real capacity of acquiring more or less pronounced experiential perspectives of the type ‘like 
to be X’ for all sufficiently developed natural beings” [1; p.508]. In his view, “experiential 
perspectivity” is part of the furniture of the world (of “what there is”), and thus irreducible to 
spatio-temporal configurations of physical entities. Being an “ontological primitive”, an 
essential ingredient of our fundamental ontology, it is simply wrong to assume that its 
properties might be deducible from physical properties. Now, although it might be claimed 
that the proffered solution does, in a way, solve the reality of the experiential domain, the 
solution comes at a high price. First of all, it is not really an explanation (at least by 
materialist’s standards), but merely a postulate: it does not try to account for the phenomenon 
in question, but merely posits its existence. This, in itself, is not problematic (one is free to 
opt for whatever metaphysics one finds philosophically the most palatable), but it is 
problematic in light of Ule’s claim that “experiential perspectivity” must be understood as an 
addition to, or extension of, “the materiality itself”. So, not only is it an addition to the 
standard set of physical properties (materiality plus experientiality), but is actually said to 
constitute one of the defining features of materiality itself. However, if this were so, it is very 
peculiar that most of the physical world does not exhibit any trances of perspectivity and 
experientiality, whereas all creatures that are said to possess interiority are (also?) physical. 
This brings us to what I see as the second shortcoming in Ule’s account, for even if we did 
accept that the fundamental furniture of the world needs to be extended with an additional set 
of properties, it would still remain unclear as to why this additional set should be limited 
exclusively to “all sufficiently developed natural beings”. If the added set is, indeed, an elementary 
ontological ingredient of “material cosmos”, one would expect it to be present in all, and not 
only in some, of its entities. There are, of course, good empirical reasons to attribute 
interiority to “sufficiently developed” beings, especially “organisms with brains” [1; p.507], 
but since Ule explicitly refuses “a panpsychist system of any sort” [1; p.508], he is forced, on 
pain of being deemed inconsist, to provide some criteria as to why interiority is (supposed to 
be) found only in this particular class of beings and not in any others. However, given that 
“experiential perspectivity” is taken to be an ontological primitive and thus independent of 
physical properties, i.e. its emergence and features cannot be explained by arrangements of 
physical objects, it is far from clear how Ule intends to solve this problem. Although he does 
admit that he is currently unable to assess “just how far ‘back’ into animate or inanimate matter 
this [experiential perspectivity] actually goes”, an even more important question is whether 
such an explanation is possible in principle. In this regard, panpsychist solutions [2, 3] 
actually turn out to be more plausible, as they consistently ascribe the new ontological 
positum to the whole of reality (thus avoiding problems with seemingly random 
circumscription of experiential properties to a certain group of living beings only). 
But I feel that there is yet another, and much more important, sense in which Ule’s account is 
mistaken. Namely, I intend to show that certain developments in the field of philosophy of 
biology and philosophy of mind provide a theoretical and pragmatic framework that might 
enable us to tackle the problem of the naturalization of the mind from a different angle. In 
what follows, I will therefore argue that a naturalistic account of the mind broadly (!) 
construed in terms of systems theory is feasible, provided it is followed by a complementary, 




proceed in two steps. First, I will try to show how “perspectivity” might be accounted for in 
the framework of the so-called autopoietic theory and the corresponding double dialectic of 
identity and sense making, as proposed by Varela. Secondly, I will argue that this is merely 
the first part of the story, and that the second aspect of Ule’s positum, “experientiality”, 
cannot be explained within the metaphysical framework of modern naturalism, but 
necessitates a radical reformulation of our field of inquiry by embracing the fundamental 
circularity between first-person (lived experience) and third-person perspectives (science). 
Thus, the process of the naturalization of life and mind needs to be reciprocated by the 
process of the phenomenologization of nature, which entails not only slight modifications in, 
but a radical reconceptualization of, nature and naturalism [4]. 
BETWEEN NATURALIZATION … (PERSPECTIVITY) 
The first thing that needs to be pointed out is that there exists an important similarity between 
the “genealogical” and “metaphysical” aspect, namely they are both answers to the question how. 
But whereas the former inquires into the temporal beginnings of a given phenomenon (how 
did A’s historically evolve from B’s), the latter studies the criteria that need to be fulfilled in 
order to be able to account adequately for a given phenomenon (what parameters need to be 
satisfied in order for A’s to adequately explain B’s). The first question, the question of the 
“mystery of origins”, seems unanswerable – “it is”, as Jonas puts it, “closed to us” [5; p.3]. In 
this regard, Ule’s account does not fare any better than the three theories he criticizes (as well 
as their expansions, e.g. Deacon and Sherman’s auto-cells), for even if it did turn out that 
mentality is an ontological primitive and hence irreducible to physical properties, we would 
still have to provide an explanation as to how this state of affairs came to be: Was mentality 
present already at the very conception of the Cosmos? If so, “where” was it before sufficiently 
complex organisms entered the evolutionary picture? If not, when – and why – did it come 
into being?, etc. The point is that the question remains (for now and possibly forever) 
shrouded in mystery, so that all we are left with are mere speculations. It is for this reason 
that the rest of the article will focus exclusively on the “metaphysical” aspect.  
It was mentioned earlier on that one of the characteristic features of (sufficiently complex) 
living beings is perspectivity, and that the latter consists in the ability to establish and 
maintain a central (reference) point (i.e. interiority) which, in turn, enables meaningful 
relations with the environment (i.e. exteriority). But what aspect of material nature, what set 
of inanimate processes, might account for, or at least shed light on, this fundamental interplay 
between “inside” and “outside”, between the organism and its surroundings? Hans Jonas, in 
his classical piece The Phenomenon of Life [5], provides an interesting answer to this 
question, suggesting that the crucial role should be attributed to – metabolism: 
In this remarkable mode of being [i.e. metabolism], the material parts of which 
the organism consists at a given instant are to the penetrating observer only 
temporary, passing contents whose joint material identity does not coincide 
with the identity of the whole which they enter and leave, and which sustains 
its own identity by the very act of foreign matter passing through the system, 
the living form. It is never the same materially and yet persists as its same self, 
by not remaining the same matter [5; pp.75-76]. 
In other words, metabolic processes enable the organism to constitute itself as an individual 
identity (stable “organic form”) against the constant flux of its material constituents 
(everchanging “matter”). However, animate organic wholes are not to be conflated with 
inanimate dynamic wholes, since their individuality does not reside only in the eye of the 
beholder, but is their own “concern” and their own “achievement”, i.e. they are [s]ystems of 
matter that are unities of a manifold, not in virtue of a synthesizing perception whose object 




they happen to be, nor by the mere concurrence of the forces that bind their parts together, but 
in virtue of themselves, for the sake of themselves, and continually sustained by themselves. 
Here wholeness is self-integrating in active performance, and form for once is the cause 
rather than the result of the material collections in which it successively subsists [5; p.79]. In 
this dynamic process the organism not only constitutes itself as an individual unity, but also 
delimits that which it is not: its “self-isolation” sets it “against the rest of things”, against the 
world [5; p.83]. Thus, a basic polarity of interiority and exteriority, of “self” and “world”, is 
brought into existence: 
In this process of self-sustained being, the relation of the organism to its material 
substance is of a double nature: the materials are essential to it specifically, 
accidental individually: it coincides with their actual collection at the instant, 
but is not bound to any collection of instants […]. Dependent on their availability 
as materials, it is independent of their sameness as these; its own, functional 
identity, passingly incorporating theirs, is of a different order [5; p.80]. 
Hence, the fundamental relation between the organism and its environment consists of what 
Jonas refers to as “needful freedom” [5]. By constituting itself as an individual unity, the 
organism gains a certain amount of independence from the environment; but in order to 
preserve this relative autonomy it must constantly maintain specific relations with its 
surroundings. In other words, “organic form” constitutes itself against, but is not completely 
independent of, “matter”: “The privilege of freedom carries the burden of need and means 
precarious being [5; p.4].” The relation between organic form and matter is thus profoundly 
dialectical in nature: 
On the basic level, that defined by metabolism, this double aspect shows in the 
terms of metabolism itself: denoting, on the side of freedom, a capacity of 
organic form, namely to change its matter, metabolism denotes equally the 
irremissible necessity for it do so. Its ‘can’ is a ‘must’ since its execution is 
identical with being [5; p.83]. 
Perspectivity, then, is the end result of this metabolism-based “hazardous independence” of 
organisms, whose “precarious being” perpetually oscillates between freedom and necessity, 
form and matter, being and not-being [5; p.3]. Hence, it is not something limited exclusively 
to higher forms of life, but manifests itself already at its very roots, at “the basic level of all 
organic existence” [5]. It is, in other words, a fundamental and universal feature of the mode 
of being that is characterized by concern for itself, by relationality and transcendence: 
“[L]ife is essentially relationship; and relation as such implies ‘transcendence’, a 
going-beyond-itself on the part of that which entertains relation” [5; pp.3-4]. Living being is a 
pulsating polarity, constantly torn between its self-subsisting identity and that beyond, which 
forms its horizon of ruthless necessity and indefinite possibility. 
However, Jonas’ account, though intriguing, is incomplete. What it lacks, is a comprehensive 
model that would explain how metabolism instigates this back-and-forth (circular) dynamic 
between organic form and matter. The missing explanatory link, as I will try to show, is 
provided by Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, an important and much needed 
complement to Jonas’ stimulating, but essentially conjectural proposal. Maturana and Varela 
are in full agreement with Jonas when they state that life is not so much a matter of chemical 
composition, reproduction, and so on, as it is a matter of organization, a matter of form. But 
what kind of organization? What is it about the animate organic form that distinguishes it 
from inanimate assemblies of matter? According to Maturana and Varela, that which 
characterizes living beings is their ability to continually self-produce [6; p.43]. An 
autopoietic (self-producing) system is a self-organizing system defined by a double dialectic2: 




Let us look at each in turn. 
First and foremost, an autopoietic system is “organized as a self-producing network of 
processes that also constitute the system as a topological unity” [8; p.115]. Take, for instance, 
the basic unit of life: a living cell. On the one hand, cell metabolism produces molecular 
components that constitute a network of dynamic interactions, some of which are responsible 
for the production of a semi-permeable cell membrane. On the other hand, the cell membrane 
houses these molecular components, thereby reciprocally enabling the proper functioning of 
cell metabolism and preventing structured chemical interactions from disintegrating into a 
“molecular mess” [6; p.46]. What is crucial here, is that the dynamic network of molecular 
interactions and the boundary housing them are actually parts of the same process: metabolic 
processes creates the membrane, which in turn (reciprocally) enables and co-constitutes 
metabolism (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the autopoietic closure of the living cell [9; p.75]. 
The first dimension of autopoiesis – whose main vehicle is, as correctly surmised by Jonas, 
metabolism – can thus be construed as a biological dialectic between parts and the whole, 
between local interaction rules pertaining to the individual components and global properties 
of the emergent whole (or what Ule might refer to as “central referential point”): on the one 
hand, the network of molecular interactions constitutes a distinct, discrete unit (cell); on the 
other hand, the emergent unit combines structural constituents (molecular components) into a 
dynamic network of interactions [10; pp.31-32]: 
Metabolic processes within the cell determine these boundaries [e.g. the cell 
membrane], but the metabolic processes themselves are made possible by 
those very boundaries. In this way cell emerges as a figure out of a chemical 
background [11; p.99]3. 
The Autopoietic self-organization constitutes living beings as autonomous units, i.e. it 
enables them “to specify [their] own laws, what is proper to [them]” [6; p.46]. This “circular, 
closed, self-referential characteristic” of autopoietic systems is known as organizational or 
operational closure [10; p.33], and refers to the fact that all changes occurring in an 
autopoietic unit are determined by their internal dynamics and not by external factors: 
“[E]very constituent process is conditioned by some other process in the system” [12; p.24]. 
Note, however, that “closure” is not the same as “closedness” or “isolation”: autopoietic 
systems as autonomous organizations are operationally closed, but thermodynamically open. 
In other words, an autopoietic system is involved in an on-going exchange of matter and 
energy with its environment, while at the same time maintaining its identity by regulating the 
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The dialectic of identity can thus be understood as an on-going circular process, in which “a 
cell produces its own components, which in turn produce it” [11; p.98]. It defines autopoietic 
systems as: (i) autonomous (all changes that happen in the system serve to preserve its self-
organization); (ii) individualized (by preserving its self-organization, the system actively 
preserves its identity); (iii) units (the self-constituting processes of the system define the 
system’s boundary); and (iv) operationally closed (external perturbations can trigger, but 
cannot determine, internal structural changes) [13; p.226]. 
Let us now move on to the dialectic of sense-making. The first dialectic, as we have seen, 
deals with the relationship between an organism and its components; the second dialectic, on 
the other hand, deals with the relationship between autopoietic systems and their 
environment. As Varela points out, what immediately strikes the eye is that autopoietic units 
are characterized by an intriguing paradoxicality: 
[T]he living system must distinguish itself from its environment [operational 
closure], while at the same time maintaining its coupling [thermodynamic 
openness]; [however], this linkage cannot be detached, since it is against this 
very environment from which the organism arises, comes forth [14; p.7]. 
One cannot but note striking similarities with Jonas’ characterization of “needful freedom”: 
By constituting itself as a unit, the autopoietic system engenders its interiority and, at the same 
stroke, delineates its exteriority, i.e. that which counts as the other and thus remains outside 
of it. But this newly constituted alterity – and here comes an important addition to Jonas’ 
original account – is not neutral: the maintenance and regulation of autopoietic organization 
requires structural coupling between the inside and the outside, which means that, for an 
organism, some interactions – those pertinent for preserving its structural coherence – are 
more important than others. Preservation of identity thus brings forth a certain perspective, an 
environment – for – the – organism (“environment for the system” in Varelian terminology) as 
distinct from the environment – for – the – observer (“environment of the system” in Varelian 
terminology). By distinguishing itself from, and constituting itself against, its “surroundings”, 
the autopoietic system simultaneously gives rise to its world, milieu or niche [15]. 
Unlike the physicochemical environment (environment – for – the – observer) the world 
(environment – for – the – organism)4 is “a place of salience, meaning and value”, a place “of 
attraction and repulsion, of approach and escape” 5 [12; p.25, 16; p.386]. To illustrate this, 
consider the example of motile bacteria swimming uphill in a food gradient: 
The cells tumble about until they hit upon an orientation that increases their 
exposure to sugar, at which point they swim forward, up-gradient, toward the 
zone of greatest sugar concentration. Sugar is significant to these organisms 
and more of it is better than less because of the way their metabolism 
chemically realizes their autonomous organization. The significance and 
valence of sugar are not intrinsic to sugar molecules; they are relational 
features, tied to the bacteria as autonomous unities. Sugar has significance as 
food, but only in the milieu that the organism itself enacts through its 
autonomous dynamics [12; pp.24-25]. 
Bacterial chemotaxis is a minimal, but highly illustrative example of how a living being 
as an autonomous system gives rise to its own niche, its “environment of biological 
significance” [11; p.153]. Sugar, in itself, is devoid of meaning; its “surplus of 
significance” [17] – its valence is inextricably linked to a unique perspective of an 
individual organism. In other words, sugar can be perceived as a nutrient merely from the 




Physical and chemical phenomena, in and of themselves, have no particular 
significance or meaning; they are not “for” anyone. Living beings shape the 
[environment] into meaningful domains of interaction and thereby bring forth 
their own [worlds] of significance and valence [11; pp.153-154]. 
According to the theory of autopoiesis, it is precisely this sense-making, this bringing forth of 
a world, that forms the essence of perspectivity. On this view, and in line with Jonas’ account, 
perspectivity is not a specifically human, but a universal biological quality: it is common to all 
living beings, from the simplest bacteria to the complex vertebra, and consists of a two-sided 
process in which a living being as an autonomous system brings forth itself and its world. In 
other words, perspectivity (pace Ule) is not limited exclusively to creatures with a central 
nervous system, but is incorporated into the very fabric of life; furthermore, it is not limited 
to the system’s internal states, but is a relational process taking place between the system and 
its world (in Jonasian terms, it is characterized by relationality and transcendence). 
In short, the dialectic of sense-making could be characterized as the “dynamic co-emergence 
of interiority and exteriority” [11; p.79]: by establishing itself as an autonomous unity, an 
autopoietic system simultaneously gives rise to its world, i.e. its domain of meaning, significance, 
and value. Note that sense-making is not to be construed as homeo-stasis, but rather as 
homeo-dynamis: in order to preserve its autopoietic structure, an organism must endlessly 
enact structural alterations, i.e., it must engage in an on-going dynamis, for any cessation of 
activity, any stasis, leads to disintegration and death. In Jonas’ words: “Once it [the living 
form] becomes the same with the sameness of its material contents – if any two ‘time slices’ 
of it become, as to their individual contents, identical with each other and with the slices 
between then – it ceases to live; it dies […]” [5; p.76]. The autopoietic system is forced to 
constantly re-assert its individuality through meaningful couplings with its environment: 
preserving the structural coherence between the inside and the outside is thus, strictly speaking, 
always a matter of re-establishing it, of re-creating it, instead of simply maintaining it. 
To recapitulate: A living being as an autopoietic system can be construed as an embodiment 
of a double dialectic: 
a) dialectic of identity (parts-whole): dialectic between local conditions (network of 
metabolic interactions) and the global autonomous entity (cell as a membrane-bound unit); 
b) dialectic of sense-making (interiority-exteriority): dialectic between the emergent 
(minimal) self and its world (the domain of valence and meaning) [7]. 
Note that these are not two separate processes, but two aspects of the same process. A global 
autonomous entity, constituted against the background of a network of metabolic interactions 
(operational closure), brings forth a world (surplus of significance); this world, in turn, 
delineates meaningful domains of interaction that are crucial for the undisturbed functioning 
of the metabolic network, and thus provides conditions facilitating the perpetual (dynamic) 
reassertion of the organism’s autonomy (thermodynamic openness). The process itself is 
profoundly paradoxical: bringing forth a world is an attempt at re-establishing appropriate 
coupling with the environment so as to preserve the organism’s organization (“burden of 
need”); but in re-asserting itself as an autonomous unit the organism separates itself from the 
environment, thus giving rise to its distinct world (“privilege of freedom”) [7; p.87]. 
Moreover, and as already hinted above, this fundamental double dialectic does not apply 
solely to the basic organic level, but can be also found in higher life forms. That is to say, all 
other dynamisms of life (neuro-logic, enacto-logic, etc.) are structurally similar to, and 
genealogically originate from, the fundamental bio-logic [7, 9, 14]. 
The double dialectic of identity and sense-making thus provides a general framework for the 
naturalized conception of perspectivity, in that it accounts for both criteria mentioned by Ule: 




it shows (i) how the organism constitutes and maintains itself as an autonomous whole, and 
(ii) then how, in turn, this autonomous “referential point” engenders meaningful relations 
with its environment and hence gives rise to its world. This claim, however, merits further 
qualification. Later research on the topic [18-21] suggests that the notion of autopoiesis, at 
least in its original conception, is indeed a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for life, 
primarily on account of its inability to explain purposiveness and normativity [8]. One might 
feel that this throws a dire light on our project, as it seems to undermine the prospect of 
constructing a viable naturalistic account of perspectivity. 
Here, two things bear pointing out: first, most critics do not dispute the validity of the 
fundamental bio-logic as construed above, but simply argue that the original conception fails 
to meet its theoretical requirements and therefore needs to be refined and improved upon. For 
example, Di Paolo [19, 20] points out that minimally autopoietic systems exhibit a rigid, 
conservative, all – or – nothing type of self-preservance (life vs. death) that leaves no room 
for more flexible, dynamic gradations in viability (e.g. becoming, development, heath; 
fatigue, sickness, stress) that are needed for sense-making. For this reason, he suggests that 
“autopoiesis” has to be coupled with “adaptivity”, a complex capacity that enables the 
organism to regulate its states and activities in relation to conditions of viability in the 
environment and attend to them through self-generated norms of activity, which allows the 
organism “to avoid risky situations and seek preferable ones” [19; p.438]. Note, however, 
that Di Paolo’s contribution is not intended as a substitute for, but rather as a complement to, 
the original autopoietic theory. Similarly, Thompson speaks of autopoiesis “in a broad sense 
that includes adaptivity” [8; p.116], suggesting that these modifications are actually 
enrichments of the original idea. 
Moreover, Froese and Stewart [21] argue that, from the time of its inception in the 1970’s, 
the concept of autopoiesis has undergone significant shifts in emphasis and meaning, so that, 
when using the term, it is advisable to at least distinguish between “Ashbyan” approaches, i.e. 
more static approaches that are rooted in the classical cybernetic framework, and “Kantian” 
approaches, i.e. more dynamic approaches that are based on the complexity theory. This goes 
on to show that “autopoiesis” itself is not (yet?) a fixed model [20], but rather an open-ended 
concept that is being continually refined with recent findings (e.g. the development of the 
above mentioned complexity theory) and appropriately modified to accommodate for some of 
the shortcomings and/or discrepancies of the classical model (e.g. the realization that intrinsic 
self-production can be instantiated only in far – from – equilibrium systems such as 
dissipative structures). The specifics change, but the fundamental idea (the skeletal bio-logic) 
remains roughly the same – and it is the latter that we are interested in. 
The second point is related to, and builds on, the first one. Although most critics agree with 
the validity of the theory of autopoiesis construed as a formalized description of the living, it 
still seems that the overall account is leaving something out. Namely, despite its ability to 
explain perspectivity in terms of systems and complexity theory, the autopoietic approach 
ultimately remains an abstract, third-person theory that is unable to account for “the lived 
presence of the living being itself” [21; p.10]. Varela, in his later works, has become 
painfully aware of this, and has repeatedly called for the de-enchantment of the abstract and 
the re-enchantment of the concrete [22, 23]. The skeletal bio-logic – as well as its structural 
derivative, skeletal neuro-logic [9, 17] – help us approach just one aspect of the organism’s 
embodiment, namely its perspectivity, but does not touch upon an equally, if not even more 
important aspect, namely its experientiality. Hence, it might be argued, that even if 
autopoiesis does, in fact, provide a naturalistic account of the perspectivity dimension, the 
naturalization process as such is ultimately bound to fail, as it leaves out one of the central 




… AND PHENOMENOLOGIZATION (EXPERIENTIALITY) 
This brings us to the second aspect of Ule’s criticism, namely the claim that no naturalist 
account is capable of successfully explaining experientiality and that the latter should 
therefore be invested with the status of an irreducible ontological primitive. I would like to 
approach this issue by asking what it actually takes for us to know life, i.e. what are the 
conditions of possibility of learning what life is? In Thompson’s words [16; p.393]: 
Consider the question, how is it that we are able to recognize or comprehend 
the form or dynamic pattern of autopoiesis in the first place? Would this 
pattern be recognizable from some ideal objective standpoint? Or is it rather 
that we’re able to recognize this pattern only because it resembles the form of 
our own bodily selfhood which we know first-hand? 
Jonas phrased this problem in terms of whether life could be perceived by “the mathematical 
God”. He concluded that, from a strictly analytical standpoint (i.e. Nagel’s “view from 
nowhere”), a living being, that “apparent sameness and individuality of the organic whole”, 
would disintegrate into “a series, or a web of many series, of consecutive [physico-chemical] 
events concerning these single, persisting units of general [material] substance”, and hence, 
“all the features of a self-related autonomous entity would, in the end, appear as purely 
phenomenal, that is, fictitious” [5; pp.77-78]. The disembodied, analytical view of “the Great 
Mathematician” is destined to miss the crucial point, the point of life itself: its being self-centered 
individuality, being for itself and in contraposition to all the rest of the world, with an essential 
boundary dividing ‘inside’ and ‘outside’. […] This is the advantage we poor mortals have 
over […] mathematical God: happening to be living material things ourselves, we have our 
self-experience, as it were, peepholes into the inwardness of substance [5; p.79, 5; p.91]. 
This is what has led Jonas to proclaim tersely: “[L]ife can be only known by life” [5; p.91]. It 
is only because we ourselves are embodied beings with own (lived) interiority and selfhood 
that we are capable of grasping the fundamental dynamic of autopoiesis, the bio-logical 
dialectic of identity and sense-making. In other words, what Jonas is referring to, is the 
essential duality that, as Barbaras never tires of reminding us, imbues the French term vivre, 
the duality between “being alive (Ger. Leben)” – existence in the world – and “the feeling or 
experience of something (Ger. Erleben)” – experience of the world [24-26]. Again, it is only 
because of we have the capacity of the latter (“lived experience”) that we are able to 
recognizing the former (“living beings”): “I cannot understand the function of the living body 
except by enacting it myself, and except in so far as I am a body which rises toward the 
world” [27; p.75]. The self-constituted (rudimentary) subjectivity of the autopoietic system 
would elude us if we did not have the first-hand experience of our own subjectivity: 
We have seen how autopoiesis gives rise, in one stroke, to inwardness and 
outwardness, to the self-production of an inside that also specifies an outside to 
which it is normatively related. […] [T]his inwardness or interiority is disclosable to 
us because we ourselves are living beings who experience our own bodily 
selfhood firsthand. […] Thus, in the present context, the theory of autopoiesis 
provides a naturalistic interpretation of the teleological conception of life originating 
in experience, but our experience of our own bodily being is a condition of 
possibility for our comprehension of autopoietic selfhood [11; pp.163-164]. 
Ule is therefore right in claiming that experientiality is something fundamental, something 
irreducible, but he is wrong in postulating that it is an ontological primitive that needs to be 
made part and parcel of the material world. Experientiality is not an additional ingredient to 
the furniture of the world, but rather the condition of possibility for any kind of meaningful 
talk of the furniture of the world: 




Experience is irreducible not because it possesses metaphysically peculiar 
“properties” that can’t be squeezed into some reified, physicalist model of the 
universe, after the fashion of contemporary property dualism. It’s irreducible 
because of its ineliminable transcendental character: lived experience is always 
already presupposed by any statement, model, or theory, and the lived body is 
an a priori invariant of lived experience. Experience is die Unhintergehbarkeit 
– the “Ungobehindable” [16; p.394]. 
Note that, as already hinted in the quotation above, “the transcendental” should not be 
understood in idealist terms (say, in the vein of Husserl’s Ideas), but is much more in line 
with the non-dualism implied in Merleau-Ponty’s distinction between “lived body” (Leib) – a 
pre-reflective awareness of the body that shapes our experiential landscape (body as a living 
being) – and “physical body” (Körper) – reflective awareness of the body (body as a material 
thing). This distinction cuts through the typical mind – body duality as it anchors experience 
in materiality and materiality in experience: the human being not only “has a body” (Körperhaben), 
it also “is a body” (Leibsein), its fundamental mode of being is shaped by modes of its corporeality. 
Hence, taking experientiality seriously would not imply incorporating it into the fabric of the 
material world, but would be much closer to Varela’s call for an ongoing back – and – forth 
exchange between lived experience and natural sciences [17]. This proposal has already 
borne much fruit in the field of cognitive science with the so-called 4 EA approach to 
cognition [28; p.10]. Unlike the classical models that conceive of mind in terms of a 
computer, i.e. a symbol-manipulating machine whose role is to internally portray external 
reality, the 4 EA models conceive of mind as extended, i.e., “cognitive states and processes 
can extend beyond the boundaries of the cognizing organism,” embedded, i.e., dependent on 
“facts about our relationship to the surrounding environment,” embodied, i.e., dependent on 
“facts about our embodiment,” enactive, i.e., “dependent on aspects of the activity of the 
cognizing organism,” and affective, i.e., “dependent on the value of the object of cognition to the 
cognizer” [29; p.89]. This latter conception is much more in keeping with phenomenological 
accounts of the late Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty and explicitly eschews 
reductionisms of every stripe. What is now needed is a radicalization of this fundamental 
tendency, a systematic interweaving of the two strands at all levels of living nature. This 
would mean that the process of the naturalisation of life and mind needs to be reciprocated by 
a process of the phenomenologization of nature, a process that would “recast the very idea of 
nature and modify accordingly our modern conceptions of objectivity, subjectivity, and 
knowledge” [30; p.54]. In other words, what is needed is not a broader naturalism6, i.e. 
naturalism that merely extends the reach of the material world by adding to it the property of 
experientiality, but rather naturalism transformed, i.e., naturalism founded on a radical 
reconceptualization of the concept of nature, “one that has room for such issues as meaning, 
context, perspective, affordances and cultural sediments” [31; p.15]. 
Interestingly enough, this brings us full-circle back to our previous topic, namely to Jonas’ 
and Varela’s conceptions of the living being as a self-constituting, self-organizing entity 
“thrown” into its world. Although still in their infancy, their suggestions can be said to have 
laid the foundation for a novel reappraisal of questions such as teleology, downward 
causation, etc., and might thus be understood as a first step in the process of 
reconceptualising nature and naturalism. This is not to say that they are, in themselves, 
sufficient but merely that they are, by taking the domain of lived experience seriously, paving 
the way from an epistemologically naïve (realist) conception of nature to a 
phenomenologically-informed view that might serve as a starting point for a Valerianesque 
back – and – forth exchange between science and lived experience alluded to above. Of 




complete answer to questions of life and consciousness – I have argued elsewhere [4] that it 
cannot and that it needs to be reciprocated with an equally, if not even more radical, 
transformation at the level of our being –, but by acknowledging the blind spots in current 
naturalist approaches (perspectivity, experientiality) and offering constructive ways for 
overcoming them without ceding to eliminativist and reductionist tendencies, it might at least 
be argued that they are headed in the right direction. 
REMARKS 
1In order to omit the unwanted dualist and/or spiritualist interpretations, and in line with the 
1predominant terminology in the field, I will refrain from using the term “spirit” in the article 
1and will make use exclusively of the term “mind”. 
2The term “dialectic” is to be understood here in the sense given it by Levins and Lewontin in 
2their book The Dialectical Biologist: “These are the properties of things we call dialectical: 
2that one thing cannot exist without the other, that one acquires its properties from relation to 
2the other, that the properties of both evolve as a consequence of their interpenetration” [32; p.3]. 
3A more precise definition is provided by Varela: “An autopoietic system is organized  
3(defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (synthesis and deconstruction) 
3of components such that these components: (i) continuously regenerate and realize the 
3network that produces them, and (ii) constitute the system as a distinguishable unity in the 
3domain in which they exist” [7; p.81]. 
4Here, an important difference in terminology between Varela on the one hand and 
4Thompson on the other should be mentioned: the former uses the terms “environment” and 
4“world” to denote the “environment-for-the-observer” and the “environment-for-the-organism”, 
4respectively, while the latter use the two terms in the exact opposite sense, i.e. as referring to 
4“environment-for-the-organism” and the “environment-for-the-observer”, respectively. One 
4of the main reasons for this “semantic inversion” was Thompson’s intention to better align 
4the English with the German terminology of (particularly) phenomenological tradition (the 
4more accurate translation of Umwelt, an environment-for-the-organism, would be 
4“environment” or “niche”, and not “world”, as proposed by Varela). The article, as the 
4reader has undoubtedly noticed, follows the Varelian version, thus trying to stay closer to the 
4original literature on autopoiesis. 
5It could be argued, of course, that similar ideas underlie Jonas’ exposition of needful freedom. 
5It is obvious that the relationship between a self-constituting entity and its environment cannot 
5be neutral: a living being whose main characteristic is “concern for itself” will find certain 
5features of the environment more important than others and will thus necessarily delineate its 
5domain of significance (its “world” or “milieu” emerging against the background of the [neutral] 
5environment). However, Jonas never, at least to my knowledge, explicated these claims, i.e. 
5he failed to provide a satisfactory account as to how, and why, metabolism-based identity 
5might bring forth the “surplus of meaning”, nor did he consistently distinguish between the 
5environment-for-the-observer and the-environment-for-the-organism.  
6As correctly pointed out by Zahavi: “It is not as if matters would improve if naturalism opted 
6for some version of emergentism or property dualism. The real problem has to do with 
6naturalism’s commitment to scientism and metaphysical realism” [31; p.7]. 
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